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INTRODUCTION
The United States causes significant damage to its residents through its
excessive use of incarceration, the burden of which falls particularly heavily
on Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) communities. Today,
2.3 million people are incarcerated in the nation’s prisons and jails, and the
country leads the world in its rate of incarceration. However, over the last 15
years, states and the federal government invested significant resources in
legislative measures aiming to lower this astronomical incarceration rate.
Since 2007, at least thirty-five states have passed legislative reforms
targeting their sentencing and corrections policies with assistance through the
Justice Reinvestment Initiative. This public-private partnership includes the
U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, The Pew Charitable
Trusts, the Council of State Governments Justice Center, the Crime and
Justice Institute, and other organizations. 1 These efforts have been driven, at
least in part, by a recognition that mass incarceration has significant negative
impacts on society, including injuries to liberty, medical and mental health,
education, family unity, and taxpayers. 2 These efforts have also been driven
by a belief that prisons incarcerate people who should not be incarcerated,
either by incarcerating people whose incarceration was not required or
incarcerating people for too long.
Courts have not been sufficiently active participants in such reforms
because they have left one valuable tool in the toolbox unused—the
retroactivity of new rules to past convictions. Historically, rules of law were
applied to conduct or activities that occurred in the past. 3 However, now
1
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Justice Reinvestment: Reinvest in What Works,
https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment
[https://perma.cc/D9WF-3CDN]
(last visited July 16, 2020); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE
PROJECT,
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/projects/public-safety-performance-project/about
[https://perma.cc/48PH-T4R5] (last accessed August 5, 2020).
2
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT: REINVEST IN WHAT WORKS,
https://csgjusticecenter.org/projects/justice-reinvestment/ [https://perma.cc/D9WF-3CDN]
(last accessed August 5, 2020); NANCY LA VIGNE, URBAN INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT
INITIATIVE: EXPERIENCES FROM THE STATES 1–5 (2013).
3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS, VOL.
1, 69 (15th ed. 1809); see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach., 392 U.S.
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when an appellate court announces a rule that it considers “new,” federal
courts use the Teague test—set out by the United States Supreme Court in
1989—to decide whether to invalidate final convictions. 4 The narrow
exceptions under Teague are notoriously stringent, denying any relief to
many who are incarcerated because of convictions subsequently found to
have been obtained in violation of the Constitution. Although the Supreme
Court set forth this strict test, it subsequently made clear in Danforth v.
Minnesota that Teague provides a floor and not a ceiling, such that states can
choose to put in place their own tests to balance the interests of their states.5
As a result, the injuries caused by incarceration have become clearer and state
specific, and the desire to remedy these harms has become overwhelming. 6
It is therefore time to rethink some of the rationales that limit the application
of criminal appellate decisions in ways that keep people with final
convictions from obtaining relief.
This article argues that state courts should examine their states’ interest
in reforming mass incarceration and revive the courts’ historical authority to
more liberally make appellate decisions retroactive—in particular, decisions
that establish constitutional defects in criminal trials. This liberal
retroactivity power can create a mechanism for people incarcerated contrary
to the Constitution to return home to their communities. Doing so will help
lessen the country’s reliance on prisons, undo the harm resulting from
unconstitutional sentences courts were complicit in enforcing, and make the
system the courts uphold a more honest mechanism of justice. To
demonstrate the importance and possible application of this shift, this article
will examine retroactivity in the context of a vestige of Louisiana’s racist
criminal system: non-unanimous juries.
I. THE ROAD TO MODERN RETROACTIVITY
Credit must be given to the many who have grappled with the long and
winding history of retroactivity in the United States courts. The history of
retroactivity jurisprudence has been thoroughly covered by previous

481, 496 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964) (collectively
holding that there are some narrow circumstances in which the equities may justify nonretroactivity).
4
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1259
(2016).
5
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008).
6
Id.
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scholars. 7 This article makes only brief reference to that history to
contextualize the argument that state courts must proactively reclaim their
power to declare new rules retroactive.
Under English law, in which the United States judicial system claims its
roots, all judicial decisions were retroactive. 8 Such an approach made sense.
As originally conceived, courts did not make new law, they merely declared
what was existing law. As such, “new” declarations applied to everyone,
even if the case was final. 9 It was not the law that changed, but rather our
understanding of the law.
The birth of non-retroactivity as a rule is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The rule began as an effort to clamp down on inter-system
review of state convictions by federal courts. It was further propelled by
states’ intense negative reactions to incorporating the Bill of Rights, and was
eventually solidified in the effort to curtail the effects of the newly announced
exclusionary rule. 10 After grappling with the formulation of the rule for many
years, Teague was born, declaring that a new rule would not retroactively
apply to final convictions unless it fell into one of two narrowly defined
categories: 11 substantive constitutional rules, 12 or watershed rules of criminal
procedure. 13 The change from retroactive application to nearly complete
prospective application is best conceptualized as a policy decision aimed at
protecting state convictions from federal review, no matter how much a state
conviction offended the federal Constitution. In striking what others have
7
See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, Or “Redressability,”
After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 6 n.18 (2009) (collecting articles) for a full history of retroactivity jurisprudence.
8
Id. at 10–11; Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for nearly a thousand
years.”). Retroactivity, as used in this Article, refers to the application of a ruling by an
appellate court regarding a defect in a conviction to allow people with final convictions to
obtain either a new trial or a resentencing because those people share the same defect.
9
See Christopher M. Smith, Schriro v. Summerlin: A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2005).
10
See Lasch, supra note 7, at 3–5 (figures concerning lifespan of a typical state and federal
criminal case); see also Smith, supra note 9, at 1328 n.35 (discussing Sir William Blackstone’s
position that decisions are inherently retroactive).
11
See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, With Thoughts for the Future:
What the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What it Might, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1677, 1694 (2007) (noting that so narrow are these categories that rules are rarely found to be
retroactive).
12
Id. at 126 (defining substantive constitutional rules as laws that placed “certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe”).
13
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
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called an epistemologically unsound “Faustian bargain,” 14 the Court created
in Danforth an escape hatch that reflected the roots of Teague’s creation. In
holding that states could adopt their own retroactivity standard, the Danforth
Court recognized that when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Teague, it did
so in recognition of the states’ twin interests: comity and finality. 15
II. STATES SHOULD USE THE AUTHORITY CONFIRMED BY DANFORTH TO
CREATE NEW TESTS FOR APPLYING NEW RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
RETROACTIVELY TO MEET STATE INTERESTS
Critiques of Teague are legion. 16 Less common, but still present, are
proposed alternatives to the Teague test. 17 However, even though Teague is
a fraught test foisted on state courts to protect their own interests, few have
seized the opportunity to adopt their own standards for determining when
new rules will be retroactive to cases already final on direct appeal. Neither
comity nor finality—the primary aims that justified Teague’s retreat from
retroactivity—are persuasive reasons for a state to continue using the test.
Moreover, when state courts adopt Teague, they unnecessarily deny
themselves a tool to affect their state’s criminal justice jurisprudence and
landscape.
A. COMITY IS INAPPLICABLE TO STATES REVIEWING THEIR OWN
STATE CONVICTIONS

As the Supreme Court clarified, nearly two decades after announcing its
retroactivity standard, the premise underlying Teague was the federal court’s
limited authority to overturn final state convictions. 18 This concern should
not enter into a state’s analysis when considering which retroactivity standard
to adopt, as the premise is inapplicable to states reviewing their own
convictions. States have their own power to craft the laws and remedies that
apply to their citizens, so long as those laws and remedies rise above the
federal constitutional floor. Danforth granted the states authority to fashion
their own retroactivity standard explicitly, because states differ in how they
14

See Lasch, supra note 7, at 5, 12.
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279 (2008) (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 306).
16
See Lasch, supra note 7, at 6, n. 18 (collecting articles).
17
Some of the alternatives to Teague proposed or adopted include pipeline retroactivity.
See, e.g., State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724, 744 (N.J. 2005); Linkletter-Stovall test. See, People
v. Barnes, 917 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Mich. 2018) ; liberal application of Teague. See State v.
Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504 (Wyo. 2014) see also Christopher M. Smith, Schriro v. Summerlin:
A Fatal Accident of Timing, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 1325, 1362–69 (2005) (discussing retroactivity
for death penalty cases).
18
Danforth, 552 U.S. at 279–81.
15
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define crimes, authorize punishment, and construct rules of evidence and
criminal procedure. “States are independent sovereigns with plenary
authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe
on federal constitutional guarantees.” 19 This premise, born from notions of
comity and federalism cannot apply to states reviewing their own state
convictions. 20 As such, the Court clarified that states were free to “provide
remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable
on federal habeas.” 21 One of the twin aims of Teague—comity—cannot
justify a state’s continued allegiance. 22
Moreover, the potential for federal overreach into state convictions has
been significantly curtailed since the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA, by instituting strict
standards of review that federal courts must obey when considering state
convictions, has deeply circumscribed the federal courts’ involvement in—
and power to vacate—convictions secured by the states. 23 Continuing to
employ Teague to blunt the impact of federal review cannot justify
maintaining it. Not only does one of Teague’s aims not apply to states, but,
as federal review becomes more impotent, Teague is arguably no longer
necessary to protect state law convictions in federal courts.
B. THE CONCEPT OF FINALITY SHOULD HAVE A MINIMAL ROLE IN A
STATE COURT’S INTEREST IN RETROACTIVITY

It has been said that “[f]inality in the criminal law is an end which must
always be kept in plain view.” 24 The Teague court called it “essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system.” 25 “Without finality, the criminal
law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.” 26 Conceptually, this was so
states would not have to gather their resources to relitigate a conviction after
it was final. 27 The world has changed significantly since 1989 when Teague
was decided. Today, the resources that may be spent by a state to relitigate a
19

Id. at 280.
Id. at 279 (“Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review
of state convictions.”); see also Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1301
(La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J., dissenting); Louisiana v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1054 (La.
2020); Rhoades v. Idaho, 233 P.3d 61, 68 (Idaho 2010).
21
Danforth, 552 U.S. at 275, 277, 280–81, 288.
22
See also Lasch, supra note 7, at 18–19.
23
See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 443 (2007).
24
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971).
25
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
26
Id. at 309.
27
Id.
20
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claim often pale in comparison to the cost of continuing to incarcerate a
person convicted in a manner found to violate the Constitution.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that the United States spends
more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people behind
bars. Many experts believe that figure is a gross underestimate, though,
because it leaves out myriad hidden costs that are often borne by prisoners
and their loved ones, with women overwhelmingly shouldering the financial
burden. 28 These costs vary dramatically from state to state, but for many
states retroactive application of rules may have an economic benefit to
taxpayers and criminal justice systems.
Stepping away from the reality that a rule granting retroactivity
narrowly is not likely to actually conserve resources, at the heart of this rule
is a balancing question: what are the lives of incarcerated people worth when
balanced against the expenses of relitigating an unconstitutional conviction?
And what does it say that, in a system where the majority of people
incarcerated are BIPOC, our courts value conserving the cost of additional
litigation over the lives of those incarcerated in violation of our Constitution?
Considering that the U.S. is no stranger to spending money (and that
providing relief through retroactivity could save money) that so many state
courts hew to the Teague test prompts the disturbing conclusion that state
courts prioritize maintaining rules over just results—simplicity over fairness;
ease over complexity; white comfort over BIPOC bodies. The state courts
prioritize the fear of too much justice over real justice for BIPOC.
C. THERE IS NO GOOD REASON FOR STATES TO USE TEAGUE

Given Teague’s aims and its dubious application to states deciding
redressability of a harm occasioned by their own conviction, there remains
little reason for states to use Teague. In adhering to Teague, states sacrifice
their own participation in doctrinal development, an important avenue for
criminal justice reform, and forfeit crafting retroactivity principles tailored
to their unique needs.
Strictly adhering to Teague restricts states’ participation in doctrinal
development in two ways. First, as detailed by Christopher Lasch in The
Future of Retroactivity, the first time many state courts face important
criminal justice issues—such as ineffective assistance of counsel and
unlawful withholding of evidence by the State—is in post-conviction
proceedings. But in treating retroactivity as a threshold issue, state courts
28

Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Costs of Incarceration, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/thehidden-cost-of-incarceration [https://perma.cc/AXK7-DL5Y].
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often dispose of important constitutional issues without the benefit of
rigorous debate and without issuing guidance for lower courts. In doing so,
state courts have cut themselves out of the process of developing
jurisprudence on these important issues. 29 There is good reason for states to
contribute to developing legal doctrine: states have different histories, face
unique problems, and can be laboratories for creative solutions that serve
their populations’ particular needs. States are also arguably more in tune with
groundswells that catalyze change. But “Teague provides no incentive to the
state courts . . . to do anything but apply current doctrine in a mindless and
mechanical fashion.” 30
Second, in adopting Teague wholesale, states forgo grappling with the
complex responsibility of according justice to their citizens and avoid coming
to grips with the bargains they have struck. Instead, states take the mental
shortcut of relying on the federal retroactivity standard instead of discerning
a standard tailored to their unique laws and problems. Following Teague
cripples states and defeats the very principle the Teague Court tried to
advance. As Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Calogero pointed out in his
dissent when Louisiana adopted Teague: “the majority’s replication of the
United States Supreme Court’s rule in this area does not promote the goals
of federalism; instead, in self-defeating circularity, the majority blindly
replicates the very federal habeas rule by which the High Court attempts to
accord comity to our state laws and decisions.” 31 Sadly, after Danforth, most
state courts considering the issue have only paid lip-service to their power to
determine how to apply new rules to final convictions—and then left this
authority unclaimed. Analysis of many states’ retroactivity opinions “tend
only to the conclusion that their results are dictated less by law and reason
than by expedient judicial administration.” 32 As proof, most states have
adopted a strict construction of Teague post-Danforth with little to no
discussion of their unique criminal justice landscape. 33 On the other hand,
29

Lasch, supra note 7, at 22–23 (2009).
Smith, supra note 9, at 1366 (2005) (quoting Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap:
Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 242 (1998)).
31
Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1303 (La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting).
32
Id. at 1296.
33
Alabama (see Acra v. State, 105 So. 3d 460, 466 (Ala. 2012); Ferguson v. State, 13 So.
3d 418, 429–31 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)); Alaska (see Charles v. State, 287 P.3d 779, 787
(Alaska Ct. App. 2012)); Arizona (see State v. Mills, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0200-PR, 2008 WL
5048433, at *2 (Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008)); Colorado (People v. Tate, 352 P.3d 959, 970–71
(Colo. 2015 ); Connecticut (Dyous v. Comm’r of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 151 A.3d
30
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states that claim their post-Danforth authority engage in a more searching,
state-specific inquiry, taking into account a variety of factors, considering the
uniqueness of their state, and making independent judgements about how to
best achieve a just result. 34 States should claim their rightful place in the
landscape of doctrinal development and chart their own path forward, taking
into account the unique criminal justice issues faced by their state.

1247, 1253 (Conn. 2016)); Idaho (Fields v. State, 234 P.3d 723, 725 (Idaho 2010)); Illinois
(People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 720–21 (Ill. 2014)); Indiana (Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d
265, 272–73 (Ind. 2008)); Iowa (Thongvanh v. State, 938 N.W.2d 2, 11–12 (Iowa 2020));
Kentucky (Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky. 2009)); Massachusetts
(Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y Suffolk Cnty., 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass. 2013)); Minnesota
(Danforth v. State, 761 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. 2009)); Mississippi (Carr v. State, 178 So.
3d 320, 322 (Miss. 2015)); Montana (Beach v. State, 348 P.3d 629, 636 (Mont. 2015));
Nebraska (State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Neb. 2014)); Nevada (Ennis v. State, 137
P.3d 1095, 1099–100 (Nev. 2006)); New Mexico (Ramirez v. State, 333 P.3d 240, 244 (N.M.
2014)); New York (People v. Chacko, 119 A.D.3d 955, 955, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014));
Ohio (State v. Bishop, 7 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)); Pennsylvania
(Commonwealth v. Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 816–17 (Pa. 2016)); South Carolina (Aiken v.
Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575 (S.C. 2014)); South Dakota (Siers v. Weber, 851 N.W.2d 731,
742–43 (S.D. 2014)); Tennessee (Bush v. State, 428 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tenn. 2014)); Texas (Ex
parte De Los Reyes, 392 S.W.3d 675, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)); Vermont (In re Barber,
195 A.3d 364, 369 (Vt. 2018)); Washington (In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert, 380 P.3d 504,
509 (Wash. 2016)).
34
See In re Brown, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56, 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (the state retroactivity
standard considers “‘(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the
reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.’” (quoting In re
Lucero, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253,
267 (Mo. 2013), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019)
(stating that “the [Linkletter-Stovall] test permits [the Missouri Supreme Court] to consider
the particular facts and legal issues relevant to the specific issue before the Court”); Verduzco
v. State, 355 P.3d 902, 908 (Or. 2015) (acknowledging its authority post-Danforth to freely
determine when new federal rule should be applied retroactively and noting that “[s]uch
determinations can include a consideration of the state’s interest in the finality of convictions,
the effect of the new federal right on the validity of the conviction, the need for predictable
retroactivity rules, and the value of additional review”) (citation omitted); Wyoming v. Mares,
335 P.3d 487, 503 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that “the decisions of the courts of this state whether
to give retroactive effect to a rule of law should reflect independent judgment, based upon the
concerns of this Court and the ‘uniqueness of our state, our Constitution, and our long-standing
jurisprudence’”) (citation omitted); Rhoades v. State, 233 P.3d 61, 70 (Idaho 2010) (same);
State v. Jess, 184 P.3d 133, 153 (Haw. 2008) (noting the various permutations of retroactivity
it is permitted to apply); State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 923–24 (W. Va. 2012) (adopting
a more liberal version of Teague).
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III. STATES SHOULD ADOPT TESTS FOR RETROACTIVITY THAT REFLECT
THEIR UNIQUE PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
As the history of how retroactivity was curtailed reveals, limiting the
retroactive application of new judicial pronouncements had nothing to do
with the Court’s opinion that errors of constitutional magnitude are
committed (and that it was the Court’s job to remedy that wrong), and
everything to do with the practical implications of according relief. As the
Danforth Court found, “[a] decision by this Court that a new rule does not
apply retroactively under Teague does not imply that there was no right and
thus no violation of that right at the time of trial—only that no remedy will
be provided in federal habeas courts.” 35 States have the burden and the
obligation to remedy the wrongs they have perpetuated. It is each state that
will feel the burden of granting a remedy to those unconstitutionally
convicted and imprisoned under the laws of that state. 36 Each state will also
bear the consequences of failing to grant a remedy. Thus, the decision to
provide a remedy beyond what the United States Supreme Court will provide,
is best left with the states, which will feel the burden, but can also claim the
power, of remedying past wrongs. The decision of whether to afford a
remedy to an individual whose constitutional rights were violated by the
judicial system should result from a searching reflection of the state’s unique
interests and values. As we have seen, the decision to grant retroactive
application to a new rule can have a profound impact on the criminal justice
system and has the power to embody important values. After all, the Supreme
Court’s decision to grant retroactive effect to their decision in Atkins v.
Virginia, which held unconstitutional the execution of the intellectually
disabled, did more than just spare the lives of condemned men and women,
it evidenced our nation’s advancing understanding of how the criminal
justice system should accord dignity in punishment. 37 Similarly, the Supreme
Court’s decision banning mandatory life in prison without the possibility of
parole for juveniles gave a future to men and women imprisoned as children,
but it also affirmed our country’s belief that the criminal justice system could
be an institution of redemption and hope. 38 What the justice system
communicates, both in its substantive decisions and in its choices about how
to remedy harms, has the power to shape expectations, policy, and public
confidence in the system. As such, each state’s retroactivity inquiry should
embody the particular criminal justice issues faced by that state, its
35

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291 (2008).
Louisiana ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (La. 1992) (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting).
37
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
36
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commitment to remedying past harms, and its goals for the future
administration of justice.
IV. JIM CROW JURIES: A LOUISIANA CASE STUDY ON THE IMPORT OF A
STATE RETROACTIVITY STANDARD
Louisiana is a state that should be particularly invested in its own
decision-making regarding retroactivity because of its historic and present
challenges with incarceration and the unique opportunity with which it is
faced. In the 2019 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana,
a ruling that could apply to approximately 1,600 people with final
convictions in the State of Louisiana. 39 As of this writing, the United States
Supreme Court is considering arguments about the retroactive application of
Ramos. Even if the Supreme Court decides not to apply Ramos retroactively,
Louisiana’s racist past, its mammoth (mostly BIPOC) prison population, and
its desire for reform, compel its state courts to envision a new way to decide
retroactivity. 40
A. LOUISIANA FACES UNIQUE CHALLENGES IN ITS CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, MANY BORN DIRECTLY FROM THE STATE’S HISTORY
WITH SLAVERY AND THE DECADES THAT FOLLOWED

Before the Civil War, about half of Louisiana’s population was
enslaved 41 and its prison population was predominantly white. 42 After
slavery was abolished, Louisiana lawmakers enacted discriminatory laws
aimed at re-enslaving freed Blacks, which contributed to a demographic
change in Louisiana prisons. 43 The abolition of antebellum slavery
39
Brief of Amici Curiae the Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Orleans Public Defenders at 11, Edwards v. Vannoy, 140
S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (No. 19-5807), 2020 WL 4450431.
40
It is possible that the U.S. Supreme Court will find that Ramos did not announce a new
rule, while Teague only applies to “new rules.” See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1437
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Teague applies only to a ‘new rule,’ and the positions taken by
some in the majority may lead to the conclusion that the rule announced today is an old rule.”).
41
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1860 CENSUS: POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, (Jan. 16,
2018), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1864/dec/1860a.html [https://perma.cc/
WM33-KB7V].
42
THOMAS AIELLO, JIM CROW’S LAST STAND: NONUNANIMOUS CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS
IN LOUISIANA 10 (2015); Angela A. Allen-Bell, How the Narrative About Louisiana’s NonUnanimous Criminal Jury System Became a Person of Interest in the Case Against Justice in
the Deep South, 67 MERCER L. REV. 585, 594–95 (2016) (“The number of imprisoned African
Americans increased from less than one percent before 1861 to as much as ninety percent in
certain counties and states after 1865.”).
43
Michele Goodwin, The Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery, Capitalism, and Mass
Incarceration, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 942 (2019).
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transformed the penitentiary into a majority-Black institution, and also
shifted the labor in Louisiana prisons from industrial to plantation work—
bestowing control over newly freed Black populations to White legislators. 44
For instance, state lawmakers passed a law that provided that “‘every adult
freed man or woman shall furnish themselves with a comfortable home and
visible means of support within twenty days’” after the passage of that law. 45
Black Louisianans were “immediately arrested by any sheriff or
constable . . . and . . . hired out . . . to some citizen, being the highest bidder,
for the remainder of the year” if they failed to find housing or employment. 46
Further contributing to this demographic shift in Louisiana prisons were local
Black Codes such as one passed in Opelousas, Louisiana that criminalized
any Black who came into the town of Opelousas without “special permission
from his employer.” 47
Notably, the roughly thirty years between the Civil War and Louisiana’s
1898 Constitutional Convention were bloody and filled with terror imposed
upon Black Louisianans. Bloodshed often followed demands for Black
suffrage: a right that would have granted Black Louisianans a way to oppose
the very laws subjecting them to incarceration. This period, summarized well
by Professor Bill Quigley, saw the creation of white terrorist organizations
like Knights of the White Camelia and the White League, as well as
numerous massacres perpetrated by members within their ranks: 48
In 1866, the whole nation was rocked by the New Orleans Massacre: forty-eight
people were killed, and hundreds wounded when people gathered in an attempt to
guarantee the right to vote to African American men.
In 1868, as many as 250 people, mostly African American, were massacred by white
mobs in Opelousas, Louisiana to suppress black voter turnout. Moreover, in 1868, at

44
AIELLO, supra note 42, at 10; see also Goodwin, supra note 43, at 934–35. Notably,
there was a significant expansion of plantations in selected parishes in Louisiana—an increase
of 286 percent between 1860 and 1880—in part tied to the change in penal labor and the
exception to the Thirteenth Amendment; see also Nancy Virts, The Efficiency of Southern
Tenant Plantations, 1900–1945, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 385, 387 n.7 (1991) (citing ROGER SHUGG,
ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WHITE FARMERS AND
LABORERS DURING SLAVERY AND AFTER, 1840–1875, 239–41 (1966)).
45
Goodwin, supra note 44, at 940 n.230 (quoting JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF
CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 101–02 (1884)).
46
Id.
47
Ordinance by the Board of Police of Opelousas, Louisiana, as Printed in a New Orleans
Newspaper, Freedmen and Southern Society Project (Aug. 3, 2020), http://www.freedmen.
umd.edu/Opelousas.html [https://perma.cc/JM57-74FV].
48
Bill Quigley, The Continuing Significance of Race: Official Legislative Racial
Discrimination in Louisiana 1861 to 1974, 47 S.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2019).
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least thirty-five, possibly more than one hundred, African Americans were murdered
by marauding whites in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.
On April 13, 1873, a white mob in Colfax, Louisiana, attacked a courthouse full of
people defending the right to vote, set fire to the building, shot down people trying to
flee, and, ultimately, murdered over one hundred black men.
In 1874, white Republican elected officials in Red River Parish were killed.
Also, in 1874, the Crescent City New Orleans White League fought against city police
and federal troops and took control of the city and the state house. Liberty Place
Monument was erected to honor this insurrection—an event so important to white
citizens that, seventy-five years later, they clamored for their ancestors to be included
in glowing tributes.
On November 23, 1887, in Thibodeaux, Louisiana, white paramilitaries murdered sixty
African Americans striking for better working conditions on local sugar cane
plantations. 49

In the face of this extreme violence against Black Louisianans, and
despite that it was most often perpetrated by white Louisianans, the
population of prisons continued to shift from majority white to majority
Black. After 1870, 75 percent of incarcerated persons sentenced to convict
leasing (hard labor benefiting private entities) were Black.50 In addition to
laws enacted to keep Black citizens enslaved, significant sentencing
disparities in Louisiana contributed to the disproportionate number of
incarcerated Black citizens. Take, for instance, Theophile Chevalier:
formerly enslaved, Mr. Chevalier received a five-year sentence for stealing
$5 on the same day a white woman received “one hour in prison” for
manslaughter. 51 That same day, a Black man was sentenced to one year in
prison for killing a hog. 52
The lengths to which Louisiana went to keep Black Louisianans from
acquiring full citizenship rights is no more explicit than in the 1898 Louisiana
Constitutional Convention, explicitly gathered to counteract calls for Black
suffrage and to enshrine “white supremacy” in the State’s legal system. 53
49
Id. at 14–15 (discussing the racial historical context in which the Constitutional
Convention was held) (emphasis added).
50
AIELLO, supra note 42, at 12.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Quigley, supra note 48, at 27–28 (“Judge Thomas J. Semmes, Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee of the Convention and a former president of the American Bar Association,
described the purpose of the Convention: ‘We (meet) here to establish the supremacy of the
white race, and the white race constitutes the Democratic party of this State.’”) (quoting
United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 371 (E.D. La. 1963); see also Quigley, supra
note 47, at 29 (“The president of the constitutional convention is quoted as saying: ‘[w]hat
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Everything—from the Democratic Party advertisements for the convention,
to the opening statements at the convention—explicitly called for a renewed
oppression of Black Louisianans. 54 All delegates to the Constitutional
Convention were white. 55 The official journal stated: “Our mission was, in
the first place, to establish the supremacy of the white race in this State to the
extent to which it could be legally and constitutionally done.” 56
The agenda for the convention was Black suffrage, the criminal system,
and public education. 57 At the conclusion, the Governor addressed the
legislature, stating:
The white supremacy for which we have so long struggled at the cost of so much
precious blood and treasure, is now crystallized into the Constitution as a fundamental
part and parcel of that organic instrument, and that, too, by no subterfuge or other
evasions. With this great principle thus firmly imbedded in the Constitution, and
honestly enforced, there need be no longer any fear as to the honesty and purity of our
future elections. 58

The Governor’s prediction rang true. While there were 130,000
registered Black voters at the time of the 1898 Constitutional Convention, by
1922, that number had dramatically dropped to only 598 registered voters
because of voting restrictions put in place during the convention. 59 The 1898
Constitutional Convention reinstated mandatory segregation of schools. 60 It
allowed for sentence enhancements for multiple convictions, such as double
or triple time or life for multiple offenses. 61 And finally, the convention
care I whether the test that we have put be a new one or an old one? What care I whether it be
more or less ridiculous or not? Doesn’t it meet the case? Doesn’t it let the white man vote, and
doesn’t it stop the negro from voting, and isn’t that what we came here for?’”) (quoting Debo
P. Adegible, Voting Rights in Louisiana, 1982–2006, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 413,
416–17 (2008)).
54
Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1612 (2018)
(noting that the purpose of the Convention was to eliminate “‘the vast mass of ignorant,
illiterate and venal negroes from the privileges of the elective franchise . . . .’”) (quoting The
Following Resolutions, DAILY PICAYUNE, 9 (Jan. 4, 1898)); OFF. J. OF THE PROC. OF THE
CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 381 (H. Hearsey ed. 1898) (quoting the
opening address’s call “to eliminate from the electorate the mass of corrupt and illiterate voters
who have during the last quarter of century degraded a politics” and to perpetuate “the
supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race in Louisiana”).
55
Allen-Bell, supra note 42, at 596.
56
OFF. J. OF THE PROC. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 375 (H.
Hearsey ed. 1898).
57
Allen-Bell, supra note 42, at 596.
58
United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D. La. 1963), aff’d sub nom,
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (quoting La. Senate J. 1898, 33–35).
59
AIELLO, supra note 42, at 23.
60
La. Const. Ann. art. 248 (1898).
61
State v. Kierson, 72 So. 799, 799–800 (La. 1916).
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sought to nullify the voices of Black jurors. As explained by Justice Gorsuch
in Ramos:
Just a week before the convention, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution calling for an
investigation into whether Louisiana was systemically excluding African-Americans
from juries. Seeking to avoid unwanted national attention, and aware that this Court
would strike down any policy of overt discrimination against African-American jurors
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the delegates sought to undermine
African-American participation on juries in another way. With a careful eye on racial
demographics, the convention delegates sculpted a “facially race-neutral” rule
permitting 10-to-2 verdicts in order “to ensure that African-American juror service
would be meaningless.” 62

Louisiana remained the only state to permit non-unanimous jury
verdicts for non-petty convictions until 1934, when Oregon adopted a
comparable law.
As the years passed, not only did non-unanimous jury verdicts silence
the voices of Black jurors in criminal matters, but they also disproportionally
affected Black defendants. 63 As Justice Kavanaugh explained in his
concurrence: “In light of the racist origins of the non-unanimous jury, it is no
surprise that non-unanimous juries can make a difference in practice,
especially in cases involving Black defendants, victims, or jurors. After all,
that was the whole point of adopting the non-unanimous jury requirement in
the first place.” 64
Today, Louisiana has the highest incarceration rate in the United States.
It leads the nation in life without the possibility of parole sentences. 65 As of
June 30, 2020, 4,596 people in Louisiana were serving such sentences. 66
62
Ramos v. Louisiana 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1394 (2020) (quoting State v. Maxie, No. 13-CRR72522 (La. 11th Jud. Dist., Oct. 11, 2018)).
63
Jeff Adelson, Gordon Russell & John Simerman, How an Abnormal Louisiana Law
Deprives, Discriminates and Drives Incarceration: Tilting the Scales, ADVOCATE (Apr. 1,
2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_16fd0ece-3
2b1-11e8-8770-33eca2a325de.html [https://perma.cc/S7H7-95LF].
64
Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“silenc[ing] the voices and
negat[ing] the votes of black jurors” would be particularly impactful “in cases with black
defendants . . . .”).
65
Lea Skene, Louisiana’s Life Without Parole sentencing the Nation’s Highest—and
Some Say That Should Change, ADVOCATE (Dec. 7, 2019, 4:59 PM), https://www.theadvoca
te.com/baton_rouge/news/article_f6309822-17ac-11ea-8750-f7d212aa28f8.html
[https://perma.cc/HYR8-PHNR].
66
John Bel Edwards & James M. Le Blanc, Louisiana Corrections: Briefing Book 28 (July
2020), https://s32082.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Full-BB-Jul-20.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/QTR2-TRUB]; TCR Staff, Louisiana Leads Nation in Life Without Parole Terms, CRIME
REPORT (Dec. 12, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/12/12/louisiana-leads-nation-in-lifewithout-parole-terms [https://perma.cc/G3PL-8SDK] (“About 15 percent of Louisiana’s
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Louisiana has more inmates serving life without parole than Texas, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee combined. 67 By contrast, fewer than 70
people in United Kingdom are in prison with life without the possibility of
parole sentences. 68 In Louisiana, almost one in five of the people serving
these life without the possibility of parole sentences, received such a sentence
because of a non-unanimous jury verdict, 69 ratified by that 1898
Constitutional Convention.
Incarcerating the most residents per capita than any other place in the
word comes at a cost: Louisiana spends nearly $600 million dollars each year
on its prison system. 70 Louisiana must grapple with its racist foundations and
the real harm that these laws and practices have caused BIPOCs. Adopting a
state-specific standard that accords a remedy to those incarcerated because
of an unconstitutional and racist law provides an undeniable example of the
power state courts can have to change the criminal justice landscape of their
state by deeming “new” constitutional commands more broadly retroactive
than they would be under federal law.
B. RAMOS V. LOUISIANA AS AN EXAMPLE OF A CASE THAT,
REGARDLESS OF TEAGUE, SHOULD BE RETROACTIVE UNDER THE
INTERESTS OF LOUISIANA.

In the 1970s, cases from both Louisiana and Oregon went to the U.S.
Supreme Court seeking to end non-unanimous jury convictions. In Apodaca
v. Oregon 71 and Johnson v. Louisiana, 72 the Court considered whether nonunanimous juries violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The result
was a tangle of seven separate opinions. Five Justices adhered to the Court’s

prison population consists of people serving life without parole, the highest percentage among
all states.”).
67
TCR Staff, supra note 66.
68
U.K. Ministry of Justice, Offender Management Statistics Bulletin (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/842590/OMSQ_2019_Q2.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/YH6N-6B9S].
69
Brief of Amici Curiae the Promise of Justice Initiative, the Louisiana Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Orleans Public Defenders at 26, Edwards v. Vannoy, 140
S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (No.19-5807), 2020 WL 4450431.
70
Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections – Corrections Services,
Proposed Budget Supporting Document [FY 2019-2020], 2 https://www.doa.la.gov/opb/pub/
FY20/SupportingDocument/08A_Corrections_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94Q-L2AW].
71
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
72
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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prior decisions holding that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimity. 73 Four
of those five Justices also concluded that the incorporation doctrine required
the states to abide by the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement. 74 No
other outcome, the Justices explained, was available under the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment precedent, which established that “once it is decided
that a particular Bill of Rights guarantee [applies to the states], . . . the same
constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal
Governments.” 75 Yet Justice Powell refused to follow this precedent. 76
Instead, he cast his deciding vote based on his belief that “due process does
not require that the States apply the federal jury-trial right with all its gloss.”77
His vote combined with the plurality opinion of Justice White, which
suggested that the jury trial clause should turn on the “function served by the
jury in contemporary society,” 78 to uphold the practice of allowing criminal
convictions where some jurors disagreed with the verdict. 79 As this Court
later put it, Apodaca “held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does
not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.” 80
In the years following Apodaca, Louisiana amended—and subsequently
abandoned—its non-unanimity rule. In 1973, the State amended its
Constitution to require ten, instead of nine, out of twelve jurors to concur in
a guilty verdict. 81 Then, in 2015, historian Thomas Aiello published Jim
Crow’s Last Stand, in which he described the non-unanimity rule as the last
remnant of the racist “redeemer” agenda in the Louisiana legal system. The
largest newspaper in Louisiana, The Advocate, also ran a series of pieces
73

See id. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and concurring in the judgment in
Apodaca). See also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 380, 381–83 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson
and Apodaca).
74
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414–15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 380
(Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca).
75
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 385 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
76
Johnson, 406 at 369–71 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and concurring in the
judgment in Apodaca).
77
Id. at 371.
78
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410.
79
Id. at 406, 406 n.1; Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Powell, J., concurring in Johnson and
concurring in the judgment in Apodaca).
80
McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 766 n.14 (2010); see also Johnson, 406 U.S.
at 383 (Douglas, J., dissenting in Johnson and Apodaca) (explaining the holding of Apodaca
the same way at the time).
81
See La. Const. Ann. art. 1, § 17(A) (1974); see also La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
782(A) (1974).
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examining the non-unanimity rule’s operation and effects. The series, which
won a Pulitzer Prize, included an empirical analysis revealing that Black
defendants were significantly more likely than white defendants to be
convicted by non-unanimous verdicts. 82 This groundswell culminated in
2018, when the people of Louisiana voted to repeal the State’s non-unanimity
rule and replace it with a law requiring unanimous jury verdicts in every
felony trial. However, the new law applied only prospectively to crimes
committed on or after January 1, 2019. 83 It did not apply to cases arising from
crimes occurring before that date, even if the cases have not yet gone to trial.
Until April 20, 2020, people tried in Louisiana were still tried by juries who
knew that their vote did not need to be unanimous.
Mr. Evangelisto Ramos’s case was on direct review when the people of
Louisiana amended the Louisiana Constitution in 2018. A grand jury charged
Mr. Ramos with a single count of second-degree murder. 84 Mr. Ramos
maintained his innocence and insisted on a trial. The State’s case against Mr.
Ramos was rooted in circumstantial evidence.85 The State stressed that
witnesses saw Mr. Ramos with the victim the day before her death and that
he had admitted he had touched the garbage can in which her body was
found. 86 But the State presented no eyewitness or physical evidence directly
linking Mr. Ramos to the killing. 87 Even though police officers had
thoroughly searched Mr. Ramos’s home (where, under the prosecution’s
theory, the violent crime would presumably have taken place), the police
found no murder weapon, blood from the victim, or any trace of physical
evidence. Instead, the State relied on suppositions and innuendo. For
example, the lead detective testified that other local residents had told him
the stabbing must have been committed by a “Mexican or Hispanic”
individual, because “they like to use knives.” 88
The jury was divided after about two hours of deliberation. Two jurors
believed the prosecution had failed to prove Mr. Ramos guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt while ten jurors thought the State had proven its case
against Mr. Ramos. 89 Under Louisiana’s then-applicable non-unanimity law,
that was enough for a conviction. 90 The jury stopped deliberating and
82
83
84
85
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87
88
89
90

Adelson, Russell & Simerman, supra note 63 [https://perma.cc/S7H7-95LF].
See 2018 La. Reg. Sess., Act 722.
State v. Ramos, 231 So. 3d 44, 46 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 50.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 48.
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Id. at 53.
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delivered its verdict. 91 In 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Ramos to life in
prison without the possibility of parole—the mandatory sentence for seconddegree murder—and in March 2019 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
decide whether the Constitution permits a state to convict someone of a crime
by a non-unanimous jury verdict. 92 On April 20, 2020, the Supreme Court
reversed Mr. Ramos’s conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment’s Jury
Trial Clause requires unanimity, 93 and that this requirement applies to states
via the Fourteenth Amendment. 94 In this monumental decision, the Court
recognized the law’s racist roots, Louisiana’s desire to reconcile that past as
demonstrated in the passage of the 2018 bill, and the need to give relief to
those harmed by the bill. It stopped short, however, of declaring the new rule
retroactive, a choice that the Court is currently confronting. When it does, the
Court will be bound to apply Teague, or else overrule it in favor of a different
model.
But the same concerns that led the Court to declare a unanimous jury a
constitutional right are the concerns that militate in favor of granting
retroactive relief to the one in five incarcerated Louisianans serving life in
prison without the possibility of parole. As firmly and clearly stated by the
Chief Justice of Louisiana’s Supreme Court: “If concerns of comity and
federalism ultimately mean that the federal courts do not force us to remedy
those convictions which are already final through a writ of habeas corpus, the
moral and ethical obligation upon courts of this state to address the racial
stain of our own history is even more compelling, not less.” 95 Ramos and the
Louisiana state courts are positioned to provide a model for how states should
approach retroactivity post-Danforth. As Louisiana’s Chief Justice further
noted:
The importance of the Ramos decision—and the historic symbolism of the law that it
struck—present the opportunity to reassess Taylor and the wisdom of Louisiana using
the Teague standard in retroactivity analysis. We should. The original purpose of the
non-unanimous jury law, its continued use, and the disproportionate and detrimental
impact it has had on African American citizens for 120 years is Louisiana’s history.
The recent campaign to end the use of the law is already part of the history of this state’s
long and ongoing struggle for racial justice and equal rights for all Louisianans. That
campaign meant many more citizens now understand the law’s origins, purpose, and
discriminatory impact. And that understanding contributes to a cynicism and fatal
mistrust of Louisiana’s criminal justice system by many citizens who see the lack of
fundamental fairness and equal protection afforded to all. It is time that our state
91
92
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94
95

Id. at 46.
Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
Ramos v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
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State v. Gipson, 296 So. 3d 1051, 1056 (La. 2020) (Johnson, C.J. dissenting).
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courts—not the United States Supreme Court—decided whether we should address the
damage done by our longtime use of an invidious law.
The racist history of the law was not explicitly relevant to the Supreme Court’s
determination that the Sixth Amendment requires jury unanimity. However, a majority
of the justices considered that history as one of the principled justifications for
abandoning stare decisis and departing from the “gravely mistaken” and “egregiously
wrong” “outlier” precedent of Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 184 (1972) (in which a plurality of the Supreme Court held that Oregon and
Louisiana’s non-unanimous jury schemes did not violate the Sixth Amendment) in
favor of a correct interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement. Ramos,
140 S. Ct. at 1405, 1418. That history should be just as—if not more—persuasive to us
in deciding whether to overrule the erroneously reasoned Taylor case. I am persuaded
that we should, and that we should replace Teague’s test with one that, at least in part,
weighs the discriminatory effects of a stricken law when determining retroactive
applicability in Louisiana. 96

May the opportunity presenting Louisiana be a reminder of the role state
courts can play in shaping their criminal justice system and a clarion call to
re-claim the power they have abandoned.
CONCLUSION
On what ground would anyone have us leave Mr. Ramos in prison for the rest of his
life? Not a single Member of this Court is prepared to say Louisiana secured his
conviction constitutionally under the Sixth Amendment. No one before us suggests that
the error was harmless. Louisiana does not claim precedent commands an affirmance.
In the end, the best anyone can seem to muster against Mr. Ramos is that, if we dared
to admit in his case what we all know to be true about the Sixth Amendment, we might
have to say the same in some others. But where is the justice in that? Every judge must
learn to live with the fact he or she will make some mistakes; it comes with the territory.
But it is something else entirely to perpetuate something we all know to be wrong only
because we fear the consequences of being right.
– Justice Neal Gorsuch 97

The burden of the inequity of the country’s criminal justice system has,
for too long, been born by our incarcerated population—disproportionately
composed of people of color. By way of example, while approximately 32
percent of Louisiana’s population is Black, 69.9 percent of prisoners
incarcerated for felony convictions are Black. 98
Unsurprisingly, as recent events have revealed, this has caused marked
distrust and disillusionment with Louisiana’s criminal justice system,
particularly for the state’s Black residents, for whom the connection between
the criminal justice system and Louisiana’s racist past is all too clear. This
96
97
98
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Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408.
Gipson, 296 So. 3d at 1053.
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moment is a time to begin shifting the costs of this unfair judicial system
from our incarcerated population to the system that harmed them.
Let us start by telling those whom our system has harmed, and whose
harm is declared constitutionally intolerable by the Court, that we will no
longer deny them a remedy. Let us enact a retroactivity test that considers
our own racialized past, our overcrowded prisons, our desire to repair, and
our hope for a more just and equitable future. It is time to repair wounds
inflicted by centuries of bad policy fueled by institutional racism, social
inequity, fear, and politics. Each state must, for itself, decide whether the
ideals that define its system of justice can bear the failure to accord a remedy
to those convicted in violation of the Constitution. If each state performs this
self-inquiry in earnest, the answer will be that the system cannot bear it; that
the consequence of leaving unaddressed a system that has buckled under
decades of injustice is more calamitous than the inconvenience of too much
justice.

